

VZCZCXYZ0039
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0443/01 1601820
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 091820Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8528
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4491
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1656
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0664
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5829

S E C R E T GENEVA 000443

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2019
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-I):
MEETING OF START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA, JUNE 1,
2009, MORNING SESSION

REF: A. STATE 50910
[1](#)B. RUSSIAN PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV'S SPEECH AT HELSINKI
UNIVERSITY ON 4/20/09
[1](#)C. MOSCOW 1331 - START FOLLOW-ON DISCUSSION OPENING
SESSION MAY 19
[1](#)D. MOSCOW 1347 - START FOLLOW-ON DISCUSSION SECOND
SESSION MAY 20

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-I-001.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: June 1, 2009
Time: 11:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) At the first meeting of U.S. and Russian Delegations in Geneva on START Follow-On Negotiations, the Russian Delegation described Russia's vision for a treaty to replace the START Treaty. Antonov stressed that the paper containing the Russian vision had just been agreed "five minutes ago" and was "hot off the printer." Where possible, Russia had used the same language as in the U.S. Elements paper provided in Moscow (REF A) and it should not be seen as the "final word" but as a hybrid of the U.S. paper. Russia proposed that the new treaty be titled "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms." General points on Russia' proposal for a new treaty would: 1) build on the success of START; 2) be a bilateral treaty between the United States and Russia, with no participation of non-nuclear states; 3) replicate the structure of START; 4) have additional verification measures as necessary; and 5) be shorter, simpler and less costly than

START. For the preamble, the Russian Delegation said that Russia had taken many of the ideas from the U.S. paper and emphasized that the preamble must document the interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive forces and that the level of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems would be frozen at the level existing at time of signature.

¶4. (S) The Russian vision on limits in the new treaty would specify that: 1) seven years after entry into force, reductions would be lower than the Moscow Treaty; 2) Russia is prepared to discuss separate limits for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers; 3) Russia does not believe that the term "warhead" is properly used in the U.S. paper, which is in part modeled on START; 4) the new treaty will include notifications and exchanges of data, including new types of strategic offensive arms (SOAs); 5) missiles designed for use as a BMD interceptor should not have the capability of an ICBM or SLBM; 6) BMD launchers should be different from ICBM or SLBM launchers; 7) SOA should only be based at treaty-established locations, e.g., ICBMs should only be at ICBM bases and other permitted locations; 8) SOA should not be based outside national territory, with the exception that heavy bombers with long-range nuclear ALCMs would be banned

from being stationed outside the continental portion of national territory; 9) heavy bombers converted to a non-nuclear role must not be based at the same location as bombers with a nuclear mission; and 10) ICBMs and SLBMs should not be armed with non-nuclear warheads. Russia proposed that the new treaty include the basic treaty articles with six annexes: 1) terms and definitions; 2) initial data; 3) conversion or elimination procedures; 4) notifications; 5) inspections, visits, and exhibitions; and 6) an annex on a Bilateral Consultative Commission that would have the authority to make viability and effectiveness changes to the treaty. The Russian Delegation stated that the optimum treaty duration should be ten years; it should replace the Moscow Treaty; and should have a withdrawal provision based on one Party making a quantitative or qualitative increase in its missile defense capabilities.

¶5. (S) The Russian Delegation closed the morning meeting by stressing the importance of President Medvedev's recent Helsinki speech (REF B), which included comments on FMCT, weapons in outer space, and conditions for signing the new treaty. The Russian Delegation reiterated the importance Russia places on the interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive forces.

¶6. (S) The U.S. Delegation acknowledged the Russian Delegation's remarks, but reminded them that issues that addressed missile defense were being discussed in a separate forum and that the recent meetings in Moscow on this subject had been very positive. The charge from Presidents Obama and Medvedev was to develop an agreement for a START Follow-On Treaty.

WELCOME, GOALS AND REVIEW
OF "HOMEWORK" ASSIGNMENTS

¶7. (S) Russian Head of Delegation (HOD) Antonov welcomed the continuation of the START Follow-on Negotiations in his second home, Geneva at the Russian Mission, on June 1, 2009. He recognized that the delegations have much work to do, but expressed hope that they could build on the Moscow meetings (REFS C and D). Antonov acknowledged that the U.S. Delegation seemed to be better prepared than the Russian Delegation in Moscow, but stated that the Russian Delegation could catch up during this session. He promised that the Russian Delegation would provide the analysis of the U.S. proposals received in Moscow (REF A) as well their own ideas.

¶8. (S) U.S. HOD Gottemoeller expressed her hope that the START Follow-on discussions could build on the successes in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) with the agreement on a work plan by the CD this week. Antonov acknowledged the success of the CD in developing a work program and provided a Russian press statement on the results.

¶9. (S) Antonov added that there was still much to do on the START Follow-on, but stated that the Russian Side had done

its homework. He opined that the delegations would soon need to think about the form of a Presidential Statement and what the Russian and U.S. Presidents would say about the negotiations. Antonov said that both Presidents want

positive results and both delegations would try not to fail their leaderships. He stated that Lavrov had spoken to the Russian Delegation before its departure to Geneva and had asked that we work not just on what the Presidents would say, but on the parameters and vision of the new treaty. He also relayed that Russia is ready to work in a constructive manner to resolve this matter of national security. He reiterated that any differences needed to be resolved in an atmosphere of mutual respect and with good will, in this way, in his opinion, the delegations could get the job done.

¶10. (S) Gottemoeller expressed the U.S. goals for this session; first, that Russia present its views of the elements of a START Follow-on Agreement and that both Sides identify key differences; second, that Russia present its analysis and questions on the U.S. Non-paper on Elements of a START Follow-on Agreement (REF A); third, that both Sides continue their discussion of relevant concepts, such as operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNWs) and strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs); and, finally, to discuss the process required to reach a memorandum of agreement or joint understanding by the end of June in time for the July Presidential Summit.

¶11. (S) Antonov stated that he completely supported the U.S. goals and he would like to build on the Moscow session, to identify what we have achieved and what we need further work on. He then reviewed the "homework" assignments each Side undertook (REF D). For the Russian Side, it needed to provide the analysis of the U.S. papers, present its vision of the parameters of the new agreement, and present its ideas and proposals for the link between strategic offense and defense.

¶12. (S) Antonov also laid out Russia's concepts for this round of discussions. First, he expected that both Sides would develop an understanding for the subject of the treaty and relate it back to the START Treaty. In the Russian opinion, that would be done by making the subject matter warheads, launchers and delivery vehicles. Antonov said he also wanted to discuss the substance of a document for the Presidential Summit in Moscow in July. He also noted the Sides' agreement to work with Swiss authorities on seeking privileges and immunities for their delegations. Finally, he wanted to discuss developing a Joint U.S./Russian approach to deal with Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan and their concerns over not being included in the negotiations of the START Follow-on Treaty.

RUSSIAN VISION PAPER

¶13. (S) Antonov read excerpts and presented the Russian paper on "How the Russian Side Envisions the New START Treaty." (Begin comment: The paper was subsequently provided to the U.S. Delegation (the official translation follows below in paragraph 14.) End comment.) He characterized the text as having just been cleared within his delegation, fresh off the printer and that "the paper is still warm" and should not be viewed as the "final word." He expressed his regrets that they would only be able to provide the United States a copy of the text in Russian but would do

so after lunch.

¶14. (S) Begin text:

Official Translation

To be Turned Over to the
U.S. Side

Paper of the Russian Side
June 1, 2009

How the Russian Side Envisions the New START Treaty

This document reflects some of the Russian side's approaches to the main parameters of the future START follow-on agreement between Russia and the U.S. In this connection, we proceed from the understanding reached at the first round of negotiations in Moscow on May 19-20, 2009, to the effect that the START Treaty provisions will form the basis for the work.

11. Title of the Treaty:

"Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms."

This title best reflects the instructions from Presidents Medvedev and Obama of April 1, 2009, "begin bilateral intergovernmental negotiations to work out a new, comprehensive, legally binding agreement on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the START Treaty." We thereby emphasize that the new agreement will be strictly bilateral and will not provide for participation of the "non-nuclear" START Parties -- Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine -- in working out the agreement.

12. Structure of the Treaty.

In general, the structure of the treaty could replicate the structure the START Treaty. However, the wording of the text should be considerably more concise.

Preamble.

In the preamble, it would be desirable to reflect the following:

- the commitment of Russia and the U.S. to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons;
- the reduction of the role and importance of nuclear arms in maintaining international security;
- demonstrable movement toward the ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear arms;
- reaffirmation of the obligations under Article VI of the NPT;
- the efforts to strengthen international security and strategic stability and to strengthen the new strategic relationship based on trust, predictability, and cooperation;
- the interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms;
- the fact that implementation of the START Treaty has been fully and successfully completed; the continuity of disarmament efforts and future multilateralization of those efforts;
- the support for worldwide nonproliferation efforts;
- maintenance of the safety and security of nuclear arsenals;
- bringing the nuclear postures of the Russian Federation and the United States of America into alignment with our post-Cold War relationship -- no longer enemies, no prospect of war between us, and cooperating where mutually advantageous;
- the principle of equal security.

General Provisions.

Each Party will reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms quantitatively and qualitatively, will implement measures aimed at building confidence, openness, and predictability in the development of strategic relations, and will fulfill the other obligations under the future treaty.

It will be recorded that the obligations under the treaty are assumed by the Parties at the level of BMD systems

existing at the time the treaty is signed.

Maximum Levels.

Each Party will reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms so that seven years after entry into force of the treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers of those arms will not exceed agreed levels which, in accordance with the April 1, 2009, statement by the Presidents of Russia and the U.S., will be lower than those in the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. Such reductions and limitations should apply to strategic delivery vehicles and warheads.

As you know, the START Treaty uses the concept of "warhead." However, the U.S. unilaterally introduced the concept of "operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads" for the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (although that Treaty refers to "strategic nuclear warheads"). Taking into account the U.S. paper entitled "Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty," which was provided to the Russian side, the question arises of the correlation between these terms. In our view, the use of the U.S. term does not fit in with the subsequent provisions of the aforementioned U.S. document, which have been borrowed from the START Treaty.

Counting Procedure.

The Russian side's approach will be clarified after we receive explanations from the U.S. side regarding its views

on the procedure for counting strategic delivery vehicles.

Data Base.

A list of all the types of SOAs that the Parties have as of the time of signature of the treaty will be compiled. The data base would be maintained and periodically updated using the notifications provided for by the current START Treaty, with appropriate modifications. New categories of data could also be added, reflecting the provisions of the new treaty.

For newly constructed SOAs the procedure for the beginning of application of the treaty provisions will be prescribed separately.

In addition, exceptions will be stipulated for missiles intended for missile defense purposes, on the understanding that such missiles cannot be given the capabilities of ICBMs and SLBMs and that their launchers will have significant differences from ICBM and SLBM launchers.

Location.

It will be stipulated that SOAs subject to the future treaty will be located only at:

- ICBM bases;
- submarine bases;
- air bases;
- storage facilities;
- ICBM or SLBM loading facilities;
- conversion, elimination, or repair facilities;
- training facilities;
- test ranges;
- space launch facilities.

SOAs subject to the new treaty will not be based outside the continental portion of each Party's national territory.

A procedure for temporary stationing of heavy bombers outside the continental portion of national territory will be agreed upon and there will be mandatory notification of such stationing. Heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments must be based separately from heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

Additional Limitations.

Record a ban on ICBMs or SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration and some other significant limitations (a ban on conversion and use of interceptor missile launchers to place ICBMs and SLBMs in them, a ban on stationing heavy bombers with long-range nuclear ALCMs outside the continental portion of national territory, and others).

Notifications.

It would be appropriate to keep the START notification regime, simplifying and modifying it, and specifically to provide for the following:

- mutual exchange of notifications regarding the numbers and types of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and their locations; the numbers of deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and their locations; and the numbers and types of deployed heavy bombers and their basing locations;

- mutual exchange of notifications regarding the numbers and types of non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and their locations; the numbers of non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and their locations; and the number and types of test heavy bombers, training heavy bombers, and heavy bombers placed on static display, and their basing locations;

- mutual exchange of notifications regarding movement between declared facilities of items subject to the limitations provided for in the future treaty; flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs; the elimination or conversion of items and facilities; strategic offensive arms of new types; and inspections, visits, and exhibitions.

Elimination or Conversion.

Record that SOAs in excess of the numbers provided for by the new treaty must be converted or eliminated.

Simplify the elimination and conversion procedures as compared to the procedures provided for in the START Treaty. Make them less costly and less burdensome.

Confidence-Building Measures.

Confidence-building measures could be worked out in order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of the new treaty.

Use of NTM.

The use of NTM is envisaged in order to ensure verification of compliance with the provisions of the new treaty.

Inspections, Visits, and Exhibitions.

We would consider it possible to retain, in simplified form, the procedures for inspections, visits, and exhibitions provided for in the START Treaty.

In order to ensure verification of compliance with the provisions of the future treaty, each Party would have the right to conduct inspections, visits, and exhibitions.

The procedures for conducting inspections, visits, and exhibitions will be governed by an Annex on Inspections, Visits, and Exhibitions.

In order to exercise their functions effectively, for the purpose of implementing the treaty, and not for their

personal benefit, the inspectors and air crew members will be accorded the privileges and immunities specified in a Protocol on Inspections, Visits, and Exhibitions.

The objective of inspections is to verify the data on the number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, and the data on the number of warheads on them.

The objective of visits is to verify the data on the

number of non-deployed delivery vehicles, the number of non-deployed launchers, the data on new facilities provided in the course of the information exchange, and the technical characteristics of strategic offensive arms provided in the course of the information exchange or demonstrated within the framework of exhibitions of new SOA items or during confirmation of conversion of SOA items for new types of SOAs.

Each Party undertakes to conduct exhibitions to confirm the technical characteristics of new items of strategic offensive arms declared during the information exchange and to confirm the completion of conversion procedures for SOA items.

Bilateral Consultative Commission.

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the new treaty, the Parties will establish the Bilateral Consultative Commission -- BCC (the procedures for its operation could be defined in an Annex to the treaty).

Entry into force and Termination.

The treaty, including the Annexes, which are an integral part of it, will be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each of the Parties, and it would enter into force on the day instruments of ratification are exchanged.

The treaty would remain in force for 10 years, unless it were superseded before that by a follow-on agreement. The duration of the treaty could be extended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

A quantitative and qualitative increase in the capabilities of BMD systems by one of the Parties can serve as the basis for the withdrawal of the other Party from the treaty

From the moment of its entry into force, the treaty will replace the SOR Treaty, which will terminate.

In addition, an Annex to the treaty, consisting of six sections will be agreed:

- terms and definitions;
- data base;
- conversion or elimination;
- notifications;
- inspections, visits, and exhibitions;
- Bilateral Consultative Commission - BCC.

All questions that do not affect the substance of the treaty can be referred to the BCC for consideration. Its decisions on those questions will not be amendments to the treaty and, thus, will not be subject to ratification.

We would request that the U.S. side express its ideas on the substance of this document.

End text.

ANTONOV CONCLUDES AND
U.S. INITIAL RESPONSE

15. (S) Antonov ended his presentation by saying that some of the elements coincide with those presented by the United States and that some of the U.S. ideas have been developed further. He said the United States should consider this document as preliminary and not the final Russian position, and that the Russian Side was anxious to obtain the U.S. reaction. He stated that it was important for the United States to remember that Russian President Medvedev provided Russia's positions on, inter alia, START Follow-on in his speech in Helsinki in April 2009 and emphasized that it was

important for the United States to keep those positions in mind. (Begin comment: Medvedev's speech was delivered on April 20, 2009, to Helsinki University and covers a range of Russian foreign policy issues. End comment.) Antonov also acknowledged that the newly agreed work plan for the CD will alleviate two of the Russian priorities as Medvedev detailed them: the CD discussion of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and the discussion of prohibiting weapons in outer space. Of the Russian priorities detailed in Medvedev's Helsinki speech, Antonov stated that the START Follow-on negotiations will still need to define the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive weapons.

116. (S) Gottemoeller responded by acknowledging the CD4QzNk Russian presentation on the START Follow-on. As she understood the Russian proposal, it addressed inspection of launchers and warheads as well as verification procedures. Antonov replied that it was possible to simplify the procedures in the START Treaty and that the specifics could be explained in the appropriate annex. The object of the verification was the number of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers as well as data on the warheads deployed on them. With respect to visits, he

explained that the Russians wanted data and transparency measures on non-deployed launchers and new facilities. He reiterated the Russian position that verification procedures would need to address the technical characteristics of new items accountable under SOA as well as converted items.

RUSSIA'S PRINCIPAL ISSUES:
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIC
OFFENSE AND DEFENSE

118. (S) Antonov concluded his response by stating that, while the Russian Side was prepared for compromise, it did have some principal positions that were not yet agreed. He highlighted that until we define the relationship between offensive and defensive arms we would not be able to reach an agreement.

119. (S) Gottemoeller responded to Antonov's comments by stating that the U.S. had heard the Russian position loud and clear. She stated she had heard that Ambassador Steve Mull had productive discussions with Russian counterparts while visiting Moscow last week to discuss the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC). She relayed that Lieutenant General (LTG) O'Reilly's (Director, Missile Defense Agency) presentation was supposed to convey to the Russians the new U.S. ideas on strategic defensive cooperation. She reiterated the U.S. position that the JDEC negotiation venue was the proper place for discussing strategic defense issues. Antonov replied that he was aware of Ambassador Mull's visit, and even displayed a copy of LTG O'Reilly's presentation, noting that some of his colleagues had attended. He stated that the Russian Side had listened carefully and their U.S. colleagues had seemed to know Russian views, unlike the Russian proposal on a Space Weapons Treaty that seemed to have gotten lost in the State Department three years ago after Antonov handed it to former A/S Steve Rademaker because Russia had never received a response.

MOVING ON -- BUT FIRST ANOTHER
QUESTION ABOUT MISSILE DEFENSE

120. (S) Antonov stated that he did not want the focus of this session to be on BMD cooperation, which is on a completely different track, and that both Sides needed to focus on our task: when he talks about BMD, it is in the context of the connection between SOA and defensive systems. He then invited any other questions. Warner asked for clarification of how many times in the Russian proposal the new treaty referenced missile defense, did the Russians see missile defense being referenced in two or three places? As Warner heard it, the Russians referenced missile defense in the preamble and he looked forward to reading their wording, and there was at least one other reference. Antonov reviewed the Russian points on how missile defense would be included in the new treaty --+QbQ,s on missiles intended for missile defense purposes that such missiles would not be allowed the

capabilities of ICBMs and SLBMs and, finally, there would also be language in the article on withdrawal provisions that specified the right of a Party to withdraw if the other Side quantitatively or qualitatively improved its missile defense systems. (Begin note: four places total. End note.)

¶21. (S) The Morning session concluded, Antonov promised to deliver the Russian draft proposal after lunch and to answer any other U.S. questions on the proposal.

¶22. (U) Participants.

U.S.:

Ms. Gottemoeller
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
LtCol Comeau
Mr. Couch
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Fortier
Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Kron
Dr. Look
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Dr. Warner
Ms. Gross (Int)
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Belyakov
Mr. Ermakov
Mr. Ilin
Mr. Izrazov
Mr. Koshelev
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Lychaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Col Novikov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Schevtchenko
Mr. Semin
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Trifonov
Mr. Uveev
Mr. Vasiliev
Col Zaytsev
Mr. Lakeev (Int)

¶23. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
STORELLA